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Adam Wagstaff’s (2011) recent paper sends a strong reminder that binary variables 
occur frequently in health inequality studies, and that it is important to examine whether 
the standard measurement tools can be applied without any modification when the 
health variable happens to be binary. In his note he reconsiders what he wrote 
previously on the subject (Wagstaff, 2005), in the light of recent work on bounded 
variables (Clarke et al., 2002; Erreygers, 2009a,b; Wagstaff, 2009; Erreygers and Van 
Ourti, 2010). While Wagstaff’s contribution undoubtedly enriches a much-needed 
debate, crucial aspects of his paper seriously misrepresent the positions and views set 
forth in Erreygers and Van Ourti (2010). In this note we would like to put the record 
straight, focusing on five specific points. 
 
1. In Erreygers and Van Ourti (2010), we have tried to make a careful analysis of the 
issues involved in the measurement of socioeconomic inequality of health/health 
care/health expenditures by means of rank-dependent indices. This paper builds on the 
extensive literature on the Concentration Index, to which Adam Wagstaff has made 
many and distinctive contributions. We pay special attention to the nature of the health 
variable under consideration, an aspect which in our opinion had been relatively 
neglected. Since Wagstaff’s (2011) recent paper contains a more detailed exploration of 
the case of binary variables, we welcome it as a valuable input to an ongoing 
investigation. Unfortunately, its starting point is an erroneous interpretation of our 
position. 
 According to Wagstaff (2011) we claim that because binary variables are 
ordinal, they are ipso facto unsuitable for any inequality analysis. This can only be 
called a gross distortion of what we maintain in the paper. In fact, after observing that 
“ordinal measurement scales do not allow differences between individuals to be 
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compared” (Erreygers and Van Ourti, 2010), we immediately add the following 
qualification with regard to a variable of a categorical or binary nature: “If, however, 
such a variable can be transformed into or proxied by a cardinal variable, it becomes 
possible to compare these health differences.” (ibidem) It is also instructive to reflect on 
the footnote which we append to this sentence: “For example, van Doorslaer and Jones 
(2003) have projected the ordinal self-assessed health categories upon the cardinal HUI-
scale. In case of a binary 0/1 indicator, one might overcome the ordinal nature by 
assuming that it expresses the presence of a certain condition in percentage points, i.e. 
100% or 0%. While this seems somewhat implausible at the individual level, it makes 
sense at the aggregate level (e.g. percentiles).” (ibidem) Put differently, we say that 
when we are dealing with binary variables we can always treat them as cardinal (even 
ratio-scale) variables, and when we are dealing with categorical variables we can 
sometimes do this. The suggestion that in our view binary variables can never be used 
for inequality analysis is almost exactly the opposite of what we have written.  
 
2. In our paper we also make an explicit distinction between bounded and unbounded 
variables, and between cardinal, ratio-scale and absolute measurement scales. We 
cannot discuss in any detail the implications for rank-dependent inequality measurement 
in each of the separate cases as we do in the paper, but we have to stress that the 
distinction between bounded and unbounded variables – in particular, whether there is a 
finite upper bound or not – is crucial in our opinion. When the health variable is 
unbounded, the standard measurement apparatus seems to be fairly appropriate; when 
the variable is bounded, however, one needs to decide whether inequality rankings in 
attainments (i.e. health) or in shortfalls (i.e. illness = maximum health minus actual 
health) should convey a different message. The answer to this question depends on a 
value judgment and several ethical stances can be taken. 
 Erreygers (2009a,b) has argued that inequalities in shortfalls should ‘mirror’ 
inequalities in attainments, i.e. the magnitude of the two types of inequality should be 
identical. This mirror condition has recently been further underpinned and generalized 
by Lambert and Zheng (2011), albeit in a slightly different context.
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 In our paper we 
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show that an entire class of rank-dependent indices satisfies the mirror condition. While 
Wagstaff’s (2005) normalization belongs to this class, the standard concentration index 
does not. This is acknowledged by Wagstaff (2011) when he writes that “…if one feels 
attracted to the value judgment implied by the original concentration index, then my 
normalization is wrong and we face the problem that a ranking of countries can depend 
on which attribute is coded zero”. 
 While our paper draws attention to the fact that an additional value judgment 
must be made when dealing with a bounded variable (such as a binary variable), we 
leave it to the reader to decide what value judgment he or she prefers. It is the whole set 
of preferred value judgments and choices which ultimately points in the direction of a 
particular normalization.
3
 We therefore disagree with Wagstaff’s (2011) conclusion that 
“…criticisms of the normalization I proposed, and indeed of the use of the binary 
variable for inequality analysis, stem from a misrepresentation of the properties of the 
binary variable…”.The objections we have raised to Wagstaff’s normalization are based 
on the implied properties of his index, and have little to do with the binary nature of the 
health variable. Our paper clarifies that the choice of one normalization rather than 
another is not simply a matter of convenience: it has wide-ranging implications, as 
shown by the fact that the standard concentration index applied to binary variables 
violates the mirror condition. If that property is deemed unattractive, then our analysis 
provides guidelines on which class of indices – including the one proposed by Wagstaff 
(2005) – could be used alternatively. 
 
3. Wagstaff also suggests on the first page of his paper that “…criticisms of the 
normalization I proposed…stem from … a switch of focus away from relative 
inequality to absolute inequality”. Again, this is a topic which we treat at length in our 
paper. We believe that Wagstaff‘s claim is misleading for two reasons. 
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 First, one cannot speak of relative inequality and absolute inequality in the 
traditional sense in the case of bounded variables. “The difficulty when trying to apply 
these notions to bounded variables is that some of the changes are infeasible, because 
the bounds of the variables act as constraints” (Erreygers and Van Ourti, 2010). By 
developing the notions of ‘quasi-relativity’ and ‘quasi-absoluteness’, which take this 
infeasibility into account and are applicable to a wide range of bounded variables, we 
manage to resolve the difficulty. Wagstaff, however, restricts the discussion to the 
special case of binary variables and sees no need to go beyond the standard notions of 
relative and absolute inequality. We believe this is a missed opportunity to point out that 
bounded variables are of a special nature. 
 Second and much more importantly, Erreygers and Van Ourti (2010) state an 
impossibility result showing that a rank-dependent inequality index cannot at the same 
time have the property of quasi-relativity and satisfy the mirror condition. Since the 
normalization proposed by Wagstaff (2005) satisfies the mirror condition, it does not 
have the property of quasi-relativity. This also means that Wagstaff’s justification for 
his normalization – that it ensures that the index has fixed bounds “…and tries to 
separate out inequality from the mean” – is incompatible with quasi-relativity. In other 
words, dividing the standard concentration index by it maximum bound makes the 
resulting normalization satisfy the mirror condition, but fail quasi-relativity. The 
standard concentration index, on the other hand, allows for quasi-relativity, but does not 
meet the mirror condition. Hence, also the normalization proposed by Wagstaff (2005) 
shifts the focus away from relative inequality. Wagstaff seems to be aware of this issue 
when he concedes that “…while the binary variable has some unusual properties, it 
shares many of the properties of the ratio-scale variable and hence lends itself to both 
relative and absolute inequality analysis, albeit with some qualifications”. We believe 
that this statement is misleading, since the implied qualification is that the normalized 
index does not satisfy quasi-relativity. 
 
4. In our paper, we use the concepts ‘quasi-absoluteness’ and ‘quasi-relativity’ to show 
the different value judgments underlying rank-dependent indices. In the conclusion of 
our paper, we express a preference for one particular member of the subclass that 
satisfies the mirror condition, i.e. the index proposed by Erreygers (2009a), which has 
the property of quasi-absoluteness. Two things deserve to be noted at this stage: (a) we 
mention explicitly that one need not agree with our preference for an index which 
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satisfies quasi-absoluteness; and (b) we also clarify the value judgments underlying the 
other indices belonging to the general class. As we say in the paper: “If one does not 
want to impose [quasi-absoluteness], one could use the other members of the class… 
(including the Wagstaff index) that satisfy the Mirror property. In this case, one 
implicitly agrees that for some distributions inequality increases in magnitude when 
there is a ceteris paribus decrease of relative differences, which we think is 
unacceptable.” This is precisely the reason why we do not favour the normalization of 
Wagstaff, and not – as suggested by Wagstaff – because we misrepresent the properties 
of the binary variable. 
 
5. Finally, let us consider Wagstaff’s own criticism of his normalization: “…I also 
concede in this paper that the normalization I proposed is contentious in a way that has 
not previously been noted.” As a result, he seems to advocate a return to the use of the 
standard concentration index when dealing with binary variables. This is what can be 
inferred from the following quotation, in which Wagstaff (2011) discusses an example 
given by Erreygers (2009b): “…given the mean, the two distributions are maximally 
and hence equally pro-rich. But it could be argued—and contrary to Erreygers’ 
suggestion—that the second distribution is less pro-rich than the first, on the grounds 
that the privilege of being healthy is not quite so dramatically associated with being rich 
as in the first. That is, of course, what the concentration index concludes. I have some 
sympathy with this view.” In his discussion Wagstaff refers to the fact that some 
normalizations imply that the pivotal individual is not necessarily the individual with 
median income rank. The pivotal individual is the individual for which a change in 
health has no effect on measured inequality; “giving the attribute to someone who does 
not have it” changes the distribution in a pro-poor direction when the person in question 
has a lower rank than the pivotal individual, and in a pro-rich direction when the person 
has a higher rank. 
Once again, this shows the intimate connection between normalizations and 
value judgments, in this case concerning the type of changes considered to be pro-poor 
or pro-rich. There is bound to be a diversity of views about which set of value 
judgments is best. In our paper we follow the strategy of letting explicit value 
judgments decide what normalization should be adopted. Moreover, we point out that 
some choices are incoherent: for instance, no rank-dependent index can satisfy both the 
mirror condition and the property of quasi-relativity. Wagstaff seems to do the opposite: 
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by first choosing a particular normalization, and then exploring what it implies, he has 
put the cart before the horse. When realizing that “the normalization I proposed is 
contentious in a way that has not previously been noted”, Wagstaff’s fall-back option is 
to revert to the standard concentration index. Since this is equivalent to turning a blind 
eye to the crucial mirror issue we think it is a particularly unconvincing choice. 
 
To sum up, while we certainly appreciate Wagstaff’s (2011) efforts to come to grips 
with the issue of health inequality measurement in the presence of binary health 
variables, we reject both his flawed interpretation of our views on binary health 
variables, and his misleading suggestions with regard to our criticism of the 
normalization which he proposed in Wagstaff (2005). In this note we have concentrated 
on five specific points, which can be summarized as follows. 
1) We have never maintained, and do not maintain now, that binary health 
variables are unsuitable for any form of inequality analysis. 
2) When dealing with bounded variables, additional value judgments have to be 
made, and we insist that these should be made explicit. Our stance is that the 
mirror condition is of central importance, but we accept that this view may not 
be shared by all. 
3) We argue that the notions of quasi-absoluteness and quasi-relativity are useful 
devices to explore the properties of indices in the case of bounded variables. 
4) The main reason why we have criticized Wagstaff’s (2005) normalization is that 
it has neither the property of quasi-relativity nor that of quasi-absoluteness. 
5) In our opinion, Wagstaff’s (2011) apparent plea to revert to the standard 
concentration index to measure inequality with binary variables, is a poorly 
justified position. 
The message which runs through all of our comments is that we need to be fully aware 
of the underlying value judgments, and that the choice for a specific normalization 
should be guided by these value judgments, not the other way around. 
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